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Abstract
Despite its potential implications for the objectivity of scientific knowledge, the
claim that ‘scientific instruments are perspectival’ has received little critical at-
tention. Yet understanding ‘who’s point of view?’ instruments might depend upon
is invaluable to understanding how scientific knowledge is obtained. This paper
shows that whilst the unqualified claim that ‘scientific instruments are perspectival’
is epistemically unproductive, once finer-grained notions of perspectives are taken
into account, perspectivism can be used to develop new strategies for resolving well
known epistemic problems in relation to scientific instruments, such as conceptual
relativism and theory-ladeness.
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1 Introduction
A scientific instrument is any apparatus, simple or complex, used to investigate the nat-
ural world through observation and experimentation.1 For example, microscopes, cloud
chambers, and spectrographs are all scientific instruments through which we can investi-
gate the world. According to the traditional view, the results of investigations undertaken
with scientific instruments are not only invaluable for understanding the world around us,
but such results are also objective – call this the objective view of scientific instruments.
Opposed to the objective view are two related theses. The first thesis is the theory-
ladeness thesis, according to which the background theories, beliefs, or presuppositions of
an observer, that is their perspective, may affect their observations (Hanson 1958). The
1For historical accounts of instruments, see Turner (2013), McConnell (2013), Brenni (2013) and
Hackman (1989). For a conceptual classification, see Lauwerys (1937).
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second is the conceptual relativism thesis, according to which there is no ready world that
all perspectives can latch onto, instead different perspectives construct the world differ-
ently (Kuhn 1962). Both theses represent problematic epistemic challenges in relation to
the objective view of scientific instruments. Whilst both problems have been extensively
discussed in the literature in relation to observation and experimentation, comparatively
few discussions have focussed specifically on scientific instruments (Chalmers 2003, Hei-
delberger 2003, Baird 2004).2
In recent years, perspectival realism has emerged as a new view in philosophy of sci-
ence, opposed to the objective view. Perspectival realism is a view equally committed to
the mind-independence of the world and to the situatedness or perspectivity of scientific
knowledge (cf. Massimi 2018c, Giere 2006).3 According to this view, particularly as de-
fended by Giere (1999; 2000; 2006), and recently by Evans (2020), scientific instruments
should be thought of as being perspectival and as delivering ‘perspectival knowledge’.
Prima facie, this means that scientific instruments can only yield knowledge from a ‘point
of view’. Who’s point of view? Giere’s view, as we shall see, is too coarse grained for an-
swering this question. It will thus be shown that the interesting content of the claim that
‘instruments are perspectival’ reduces to the two old, much discussed, epistemic problems
of conceptual relativism and theory-ladeness.4
The novel content of this paper consists in showing that once finer-grained notions
of perspectives are taken into account – that is, ‘broad perspectives’ and ‘narrow perspec-
tives’ – perspectivism can be used to develop new strategies for resolving the two well
known epistemic problems.5
The first strategy is developed to respond to conceptual relativism brought about by
‘instrumental incommensurability’, understood as a form of discontinuity or incommen-
2See Laudan (1990) for a comprehensive discussion of both problems, and New Experimentalists, such
as Hacking (1983), Franklin (1990; 1986; 2015), Mayo (1996), Franklin and Perovic (2019) on epistemic
strategies to overcome the theory-ladeness of experiments, and other sceptical challenges.
3See Cret¸u 2020c for an accessible overview.
4For more general problems with perspectivism, beyond those related to scientific instruments, see
Chakravartty (2010; 2017), Chirimuuta (2016), and Morrison (2011). For a sustained defence of perspec-
tivism see Massimi (2012; 2018a;b;c;d).
5Broad perspectives are discussed by Massimi (2018c) and narrow perspectives are discussed, in dif-
ferent ways, by Massimi (2012) and Cret¸u (2020a). The current paper builds on and extends these earlier
analyses in a systematic way and applied in a new context.
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surability at the level of the instruments themselves. The strategy is developed around
broad perspectives, which are understood as culturally and scientifically situated theoret-
ical frameworks typical of a scientific community (Massimi 2018c). It is shown that far
from constituting a novel epistemic challenge, the dependence of instruments on broad
perspectives, when closely analysed, provides instead the means to mount a novel response
to the old epistemic challenge of conceptual relativism.
By recourse to the history and philosophy of science three points are established.
First, it is established that objectivity standards (cf. Daston and Galison 2007) – which
govern the use of scientific instruments – are not tied to any particular broad perspective
(and thus if they are perspectival they are so in a much broader sense). Second, it is
established that when broad perspectives change, objectivity standards do not change
concomitantly. And third, by drawing on two brief case studies – the history of the cloud
chamber (Galison 1997) and of stellar classifications (Hoffleit 1991) – it is established
that scientific instruments and their outputs can cut across both broad perspectives and
changing objectivity standards. Thus, as long as shifts in objectivity standards are not
abrupt and discontinuous and do not correspond to shifts in broad perspectives, knowledge
derived from scientific instruments can be objective despite changes in broad perspectives.
The second strategy is developed around narrow perspectives to respond to the
theory-ladeness challenge in relation to scientific instruments. It is shown that narrow
perspectives, which constitute the working stances of scientists, are restricted neither to
one theory nor just to theory. As such, narrow perspectives contain within them cross-
perspectival justificatory tools to render instruments and their data valid and objective.
This paper will be of value to philosophers, scientists, and historians who take sci-
entific instruments to deliver knowledge about the world. Since the challenges posed by
perspectivalist claims threaten to undermine the process of scientific knowledge produc-
tion, any disruption to the the process of using instruments to obtain scientific knowledge
is worth investigating in its own right. Furthermore, the paper presents a general strat-
egy for turning an unproductive perspectival claim, e.g., ‘instruments are perspectival’,
into novel solutions to well known problems, highlighting the epistemic productivity of
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fine-graining perspectival claims.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 examines intuitive notions of ‘perspec-
tive’ and clarifies the account proposed by Giere (1999; 2000; 2006). In Section 3 the
problem of conceptual relativism is analysed in terms of instrumental incommensurability
between broad perspectives. Thus reframed, the problem can be resolved via reference
to two novel responses, the first ‘objectivity led’, the second, ‘instrument led’. In Section
4 the problem of ‘instrumental theory-ladeness’ is separately resolved with reference to
individual scientists’ narrow perspectives. It is ultimately demonstrated that scientific
instruments can be understood as perspectival in two distinct senses, each leading to
distinct challenges for which systematic responses are provided.
2 Perspectives Clarified
To determine what, if any, the import of scientific perspectivism is in relation to scientific
instruments, and whether in this context it brings about either new epistemic challenges
or new solutions to existing epistemic challenges, two steps are necessary. First, it is
necessary to understand what kind of ‘perspectives’ are relevant to instruments. Second,
it is necessary to understand in what ways scientific instruments depend on relevant
perspectives and what epistemic consequences may result from such dependence. Only
once these steps are undertaken, can an evaluation of the claim that ‘scientific instruments
are perspectival’ be undertaken.
2.1 Intuitive Perspectives
Consider, to begin with, two of the most common meanings associated with perspectives:
the first, a private, personal point of view, the second, the human point of view. On the
one hand, to say that instruments are perspectival because they yield knowledge from
one’s own point of view is philosophically trivial. We interact with the world from our
point of view and not from another’s point of view, and in a deep sense we cannot entirely
escape our point of view, and thus to say that whatever we do know is from our own
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point of view, in not particularly epistemically productive. On the other hand, to say that
instruments are perspectival because they yield knowledge from the human point of view
is similarly unproductive. We cannot know from a non-human point of view, and thus,
whatever we do know from the human point of view is all we can know. Thus, to claim
that instruments are perspectival because they are dependent on the human perspective
or the personal perspective is to claim something that is at the same time trivially true
and epistemically unproductive.
One might nevertheless take the claim that instruments are dependent on the human
perspective to mean something about the way humans ‘see’ with and through instruments
Giere (1999; 2000; 2006). Not all human beings are equipped with the same visual system.
Though most human beings have trichromat vision which enables them to see the full-
spectrum of colours, some human beings are colour-blind. Most frequently, colour-blind
humans cannot distinguish red and green and in some cases complete colour-blindness
precludes the experience of colours. If instruments are perspectival because the results
they yield depend on the visual system which manipulates them, the perspectivity of
instruments might not be trivially true. In and of itself the claim that different visual
systems can yield different kinds of knowledge about the world is not epistemically prob-
lematic. Suppose Cat and Pat are using exactly the same microscope to look at an insect
wing. If Cat cannot see any colours and Pat can see colours, they will naturally see the
insect wing differently, Cat from a monochromatic perspective, Pat from a colourful per-
spective. Their perception of the insect wing will be inherently different, one without
colour information, the other with colour information. Thus, due to their different vi-
sual systems, Cat’s and Pat’s investigations with the same instrument can yield different
kinds of knowledge about the world. What this example suggests, however, is that the
perspectivity under discussion has nothing to do with the instrument in question. Cat
and Pat would see the insect wing differently with or without the instrument, since it is
the visual system that constitutes the relevant perspective and not anything to do with
the instrument itself.
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2.2 Scientific Perspectives
We may further assume that what makes instruments perspectival are the following per-
spectival features: i) “they respond only to a limited range of aspects of their environment”
(Giere 2006, p. 41), ii) “even for those aspects of the world to which they do respond,
the response is limited” (id.), and iii) they “have some limitations on their ability to
discriminate among inputs that are theoretically distinct” (p. 42). The first two features
have been recently discussed by Evans (2020) in his account of ‘perspectival objectivity’
and thus points of agreement or disagreement with Evans shall be noted below.6 Bearing
this in mind, let us now consider each point in turn.
The claim that scientific instruments are perspectival because they have a limited
range is hardly controversial. It is simply to say that a scientific instrument will deliver
knowledge of only some aspects of the world but not others. This is nevertheless self-
evident: every observation from the vantage point of a particular instrument is limited
to the range of inputs detectable by the relevant instrument. For example, a telescope
is useless for detecting positrons simply because the energy scale of the positrons is not
detectable by telescopes. We, as humans, are similarly ‘limited’ in that “we are sensitive
only to a certain set of variables, namely ones that can be detected by sight, sound, touch,
and taste” (p. 5) as Evans (2020) points out. And so, to take this as more than a trivial
observation regarding our sensorial range, at best belabours a point about our human
capacities and limitations. Thus, returning to scientific instruments, unless they are sup-
posed to provide more than partial access to nature, it is not clear that the ‘perspectival’
addendum does any philosophically fruitful work as applied to scientific instruments.7,8
The second respect in which instruments can be deemed perspectival is that they
have a limited response to limited inputs. To use Giere’s example, “[a] camera responds
only to radiation to which its film or more recently, its digital sensors are attuned” (p. 42).
6Evans’ claim is that whilst certain facts are perspective-dependent (though not observer-dependent),
such facts can nevertheless be objective since within a perspective, for a given feature of the world, “there
is an (intersubjectively) objective fact of the matter concerning that feature” (Evans 2020, p. 6).
7Giere himself acknowledges that “[t]here is no universal instrument that could record every aspect of
any natural object or processes” (Giere 2000, p. 11).
8This lack of scope is also pointed out by Massimi (2012), pp. 29-30.
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Since “[e]very instrument interacts with the world only from its own particular perspec-
tive” (Giere 2000, p. 10), and “part of the perspective of any instrument is determined
by its built in margin of error” (p. 11), instruments can only yield partial, perspectival
knowledge. This, then, as Evans (2020) emphasises, “is a trivial observation, in the sense
that we cannot model undetectable properties or behaviour of a system in terms of un-
detectable variables” (p. 5). According to Evans, this observation discloses, nevertheless,
something about the limitations of the perspective through which we can interact with
and model the world. Whilst Evans is right to emphasise that this point exposes the role
of our “idiosyncratic capabilities to interact with, and model, reality” (id.), the claim that
instruments are perspectival in this regard, accomplishes little beyond circumscribing the
perspective of the instrument, from, evidently, our own vantage point.
The third respect in which instruments are judged to be perspectival consists in their
inability to discriminate between theoretically distinct inputs. Prima facie this may strike
one as a misplaced charge since instruments do not have agency and so they are not meant
to distinguish between theoretically distinct inputs. But, since Giere insists that “claims
about what is observed cannot be detached from the means of observation” (Giere 2000,
p. 48) and that “[o]ne cannot detach the description of the image from the perspective
from which it was produced” (p. 56), the indiscriminateness of instruments is due to
their theory-ladeness. Realists, relativists, positivists, and pragmatists alike have long
agreed that “theories are involved in the construction and interpretation of instruments”
(Laudan 1990, p. 47) and that “theoretical assumptions go into determining the boundary
conditions supposed to apply to any situation under scrutiny” (id.). One may nevertheless
insist that there is something deeply perspectival about cases of circular theory-ladeness,
that is cases in which the theory of the instrument and the theory of the phenomena are
mutually reinforcing. Whilst this is a legitimate worry (dealt with in section 4), it is not
a particularly novel worry. Thus, once again, perspectivism, a` la Giere, does not seem to
possess novel and productive epistemic implications beyond what comes from rebranding
theory-ladeness as perspectivism.
A more promising route is to understand the claim that instruments are perspectival
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as highlighting the dependence of instruments on different kinds of perspectives. We have
seen how two different perspectives, the personal perspective and the human perspective
can come to bear on instruments, though we have found the resulting perspectivity to be
epistemically unproductive. Some of the options suggested by Giere, such as understand-
ing a perspective as “a way of constructing scientific models” (Giere 1999, p. 79) or as a
particular culture (Giere 2013) are too underspecified to be epistemically productive also.
Yet, other notions, such as the standpoint of a scientific community, for example the New-
tonian or Aristotelian perspective, or the observational standpoint of an observer or of an
instrument (Giere 2006), whilst not sufficiently fine-grained in Giere’s account, constitute
more promising routes for further investigation. In particular, two fine-grained notions of
perspective – broad perspectives (Massimi 2018a) and narrow perspectives (Massimi 2012,
Cret¸u 2020a) – can be exploited to deliver novel solutions to both conceptual relativism
and theory-ladeness, as will be shown in the next two sections.
3 Broad Perspectives
This section explores the potential benefits of thinking of perspectives as historically and
intellectually situated scientific frameworks typical of a scientific community, along the
lines of Massimi (2018a). According to Massimi (2018a), such perspectives, let us call them
broad perspectives, encompass “(i) the body of scientific knowledge claims advanced by
the scientific community at the time; (ii) the experimental, theoretical, and technological
resources available to the scientific community at the time to reliably make those scien-
tific knowledge claims; and (iii) second-order (methodological-epistemic) claims that can
justify the scientific knowledge claims so advanced” (p. 343). Thus defined, broad per-
spectives are better thought of not as a specific theory, but as research traditions.9 Like
research traditions, broad perspectives sponsor a variety of norms, background assump-
tions, ‘narrow perspectives’,10 and theories alike, as well as theories about instruments,
9This is a gloss on Massimi (2018a), who acknowledges, but does not clarify, the “important dissimilar-
ities between the diachronic [historical practices] and the synchronic [contemporary modelling practices]
notion of scientific perspectives” (p. 343.).
10More on ‘narrow perspectives’ in section 4.
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their operation, and their interpretation.11
However, whilst each such perspective can produce through its instruments and their
outputs its own conceptualisation of the world, any such conceptualisation can become
essentially non-transferrable across broad perspectives, leading to a form of incommen-
surability – let us call it instrumental incommensurability – which can lead, in turn, to
conceptual relativism. In what follows, two novel responses to instrumental incommensu-
rability are offered, an ‘objectivity led response’ and an ‘instrument led response’. But,
before we turn to these two responses it will prove instructive to understand how the
challenge arises.
3.1 Instrumental Incommensurability
Broad perspectives, understood as research traditions, articulate, through the elements
they sponsor, particular conceptualisations of the world. For example, broad perspectives
sponsor objectivity norms, and objectivity norms, in turn, govern the use of scientific
instruments. If such objectivity norms are perspectival [since embedded within a par-
ticular broad perspective], this might suggest that instruments and their outputs might
themselves be found to be perspectival. Were this to prevail, one might rightly conclude
that instruments cannot yield objective knowledge because they are essentially laden to
a particular point of view (albeit a broad one in this case). And thus, broad perspectives,
like their Kuhnian predecessors, could lead to pervasive Kuhnian “paradigm-ladeness”
and further problems thereto.
One particularly thorny problem is conceptual relativism, typically brought about
by some form of incommensurability. Conceptual relativism is an old problem for sci-
entific knowledge (see Laudan 1990, and more recently Baghramian and Carter 2019),
traditionally not directly concerned with scientific instruments. Let us nevertheless as-
sume that conceptual relativism can be brought about by some form of discontinuity or
incommensurability at the level of the instruments themselves, let us call this ‘instru-
mental incommensurability’. More precisely, let us assume that conceptual relativism can
11See Laudan (1977) on research traditions and theories, and Cret¸u (2020a;b) for the relation between
research traditions, (narrow) perspectives, and theories.
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occur if and when broad perspectives change and such change leads to either knowledge
of instrument building and operation or knowledge delivered by instruments becoming es-
sentially non-transferable from one broad perspective to the next. The non-transferability
of knowledge of instrument building or knowledge delivered by instruments can occur in
at least three ways:
a) when there is physical non-transferability of instruments and their outputs across
broad perspectives;
b) when non-transferability of technical knowledge occurs, understood as either
practical or as theoretical knowledge of instrument-building and operation, or finally,
c) when conceptual non-transferability of instruments and their outputs occurs.
Let us briefly examine each in turn. Broad perspectives are extended in time and
thus a) the physical non-transferability of instruments, as well as of their physical out-
puts is unfortunately unavoidable. Instruments may become irreproducible on certain
timescales due to lack of material resources or they can become obsolete when more effi-
cient alternatives are developed (i.e., less costly, more sustainable etc.). Instruments are
also likely to deteriorate, can be moved, can fall into disrepair or fall pray to accidents and
natural disasters. All these possibilities can make instruments, as well as their outputs,
physically non-transferrable across broad perspectives. This kind of non-transferability,
even if seen as some form of broad perspectivity, would nevertheless be entirely acciden-
tally located within a broad perspective. For accidental occurrences that may lead to
the destruction of instruments to coincide with the cut-off point of the transition from
one broad perspective to another is not only an entirely contingent matter, it is also
exceedingly unlikely. If this were nonetheless to occur, it could lead to a form of (radi-
cal) conceptual relativism brought about, inter alia, by instrumental incommensurability
between broad perspectives. To be precise, since different instrumental perspectives can
be said to construct the world differently, any discontinuity between such perspectives
may preclude any commonly established facts between the relevant perspectives, leading
thus to conceptual relativism. Whilst this is a serious problem for the progress of science,
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conceptual relativism is neither a distinctively perspectival challenge (but an old Kuhnian
challenge), nor is it a challenge specific to, or restricted to, scientific instruments.12
Unlike the physical non-transferability of instruments, b) the technical non-transferability
of instruments is more likely to occur.13 Yet, like the physical non-transferability of in-
struments, technical non-transferability amounts to the same type of Kuhnian challenge,
since non-transferability precludes the possibility of commonly established facts (because
the facts can no longer be produced, recognised etc.). Thus, whilst one can rightly take the
technical non-transferability of instruments as a form of perspectivism, it remains to be
shown that this kind of perspectivism is distinctively different from Kuhnian paradigm-
ladeness which can be said to lead to conceptual relativism via instrumental incommen-
surability.
Finally, c) the conceptual non-transferability of instruments and their outputs across
broad perspectives constitutes an equally serious problem as their technical non-transferability.
If instruments and their outputs are conceptually laden to broad perspectives, then each
broad perspective produces through its instruments and their outputs, its own concep-
tualisation of the world. To put it differently, the non-transferability of instruments and
their outputs across broad perspectives means that all knowledge yielded by instruments
can only be knowledge from within a perspective. This amounts to a type of perspectivity
akin to conceptual relativism. Insofar as perspectivity amounts to conceptual relativism,
there is, once more, no novel epistemic import of perspectivity. However, whilst concep-
tual relativism is not a distinctively perspectival challenge, two distinctively perspectival
responses are available in relation to instruments, as will be argued in the remainder of
this section.
An important clarification is in order before we proceed to the two responses. It was
thus far assumed that objectivity norms are perspectival, that is, that they are specific to
12Conceptual relativism, typically associated with Kuhn, has given rise to a vast literature, not specifi-
cally tailored to scientific instruments, and as such, it shall not be dealt with here. Two different responses
to conceptual relativism, tailored to the case of scientific instruments will be offered in sections 3.2&3.3.
For a general and clear discussion of the intricacies of relativism and different solutions, see Laudan
(1990).
13See Hicks (2017) for a fascinating case of technical discontinuity and Galison (1997) for technical
continuity in particle physics.
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a broad perspective.14 It was further assumed that if broad perspectives are regarded as
insular and disjointed, then changes in broad perspectives automatically lead to wholesale
changes, including changes in objectivity standards, which can bring about conceptual
relativism. Yet there are strong reasons to resist the assumption that objectivity standards
are perspectival in the way previously assumed for three main reasons:
i. first, the scholarship on the history of objectivity suggests that objectivity standards
are not tied to any particular broad perspective (and thus if they are perspectival
they are so in a much broader sense);
ii. second, when broad perspectives change, objectivity standards do not change con-
comitantly; and,
iii. third, and most importantly, scientific instruments and their outputs typically cut
across both broad perspectives and changing objectivity standards.
The first two reasons can be combined to mount a novel ‘objectivity led’ response
to the instrumental incommensurability challenge to which we turn to in 3.2, whilst the
third reason guides a novel ‘instrument led’ response to which we will turn to in 3.3.
3.2 Objectivity led Response
In this section it is shown that norms or standards of objectivity are not inherently tied to
any particular broad perspective nor do they necessarily change concomitantly with any
broad perspective. On the contrary, it is shown that older standards can survive along-
side succeeding predominant standards, even past the predominance of the succeeding
standard. For example, as Daston and Galison indicate, ‘truth-to-nature’ survived not
only alongside ‘mechanical objectivity’, but also alongside ‘structural objectivity’, and
trained judgement’ (all of which are detailed below). Thus, if, as Daston and Galison
(2007) suggest, objectivity standards changed first and foremost in response to particular
subjectivity threats, such as idealisation, distortion, or automation, we can reasonably as-
sume that each standard of objectivity ‘strove’ away from perspectivity to apersepctivity.
14Note that a similar assumption would be warranted within Giere’s (2006) scientific perspectivism.
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Hence, even if objectivity standards are perceived as in some way perspectival, continuity
in objectivity standards over and above changes in broad perspectives, should suffice to
avert perspectivism-cum-conceptual relativism in relation to scientific instruments.
Daston and Galison (2007) identify four types of objectivity, each predominant in
different periods, though each relevant to other notions of objectivity over considerably
longer periods of time past their predominance. Truth-to-nature, the first standard of
objectivity identified by Daston and Galison (2007), was predominant in the 17th and
18th century. It consisted in identifying idealised types – which were arrived at through
reasoning and selection. Idealised types could not be found in nature, but they were taken
to be ‘truer’ to nature than any unruly token. Tokens had fleeting features which had to
be brought within an objective type through selection, synthesis, and idealisation. To the
17th and 18th century naturalists’ ‘unreasoned observations’ were considered subjective,
whilst the “idea in the observation” and not the observation itself was considered objective,
true-to-nature.
The truth-to-nature image of objectivity changed around 1830, giving way to me-
chanical objectivity which regulated scientific practice for nearly a century. New means
of mechanisation and automation promised deliverances of instruments, such as photo-
graphic images, uncontaminated by the dangerous distortions of reasoned images. When
automation was not possible, exceedingly proceduralized means of recording nature with-
out distortion or interpretation were developed, which often involved “humans acting as
will-less machines” (p. 120). Yet, no automated instruments could offer ‘pure’, unadul-
terated access to nature. For example, depth of field or colour, could not be precisely
recorded by automatic means, leading to accuracy being traded off for mechanical repro-
duction. The preponderance of such trade-offs, despite automation, left an ineliminable
human element which the succeeding image of objectivity, structural objectivity, sought
to suppress.
Structural objectivity emerged in the 1880s, co-existed with mechanical objectivity
till at least the 1930s, and is still embraced by scientists and philosophers with a struc-
turalist bent today. Structural objectivity, which must be “communicable to all” and
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according to which the “private mental world of individual subjectivity” (p. 254) has no
place in the epistemology of nature, is not always applicable to instruments, except maybe
for logic devices such as counters, spark chambers, and wire chambers (see Galison 1997
for more details on the tradition of logic devices). This is because, structural objectivity is
primarily concerned with “enduring structural relationships that survived mathematical
transformations, scientific revolutions, shifts of linguistic perspective, cultural diversity,
psychological evolution, the vagaries of history, and the quirks of individual physiology”
(p. 259), and not, strictly speaking, with the deliverances of instruments. Whilst not per-
taining directly to instruments, structural objectivity is worth bringing into the present
discussion for it was concurrent with mechanical objectivity and it neither occurred nor
shifted concomitantly to broad perspectives.
Structural objectivity proved insufficiently versatile for understanding complex fam-
ilies of phenomena and thus a new form of objectivity, in the form of trained judgment, be-
came predominant between mid- to late twentieth century. Trained judgment was needed
to “synthesise, highlight, and grasp relationships” and to “smooth, refine, or classify
images” (p. 314). In stark contrast with both mechanical objectivity and structural ob-
jectivity, which sought to extirpate individual judgment, trained judgement relied on an
individual’s ability to “read, to interpret, to draw salient, significant structures from the
morass of uninteresting artifact and background” (p. 328). Trained judgment relied on
the human ability to ‘seize pattern’ and to obtain ‘knowledge at a glance’, skills that
were “acquired through a sophisticated apprenticeship” (p. 331). Interpretation, previ-
ously conceived as epistemically problematic and as stunting the effort to ‘get at the
world’, was now conceived as necessary to interpret ever more complex images produced
by sophisticated instruments.
Thus, as the history of objectivity distinctly indicates, there is no abrupt shift from
one standard of objectivity to the next. In fact, two or more standards of objectivity sur-
vive alongside one another, whilst the transition from one standard to another is clearly
traceable. Unlike the traditional Kuhnian narrative of wholesale paradigm-changes, shifts
in objectivity standards are not wholesale. Not only does each type of objectivity safe-
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guard against specific types of subjectivity and thus screens off epistemic threats such
as “drowning in details, of burking a fact to support a theory, of being straitjacketed by
mechanical procedures” (p. 377), all of which are “genuine dangers to knowledge” (id.).
But, each objectivity standard builds on and reacts to earlier specific threats to knowl-
edge. Therefore, as Daston and Galison (2007) suggest, it “is a misconception, albeit an
entrenched one, that historicism and relativism stride hand in hand” (p. 376).
If one accepts Daston and Galison’s (2007) history of objectivity, another impor-
tant observation becomes salient: objectivity shifts do not correspond to shifts in broad
perspectives. For example, Lorentzian ether theory and special relativity can both be
said to be governed by structural objectivity, despite being different broad perspectives
(for the history of special relativity and Lorentzian ether theory, see Brown 2005). Simi-
larly, trained judgment governed cloud chamber experiments both prior to and post the
crystallisation of relativistic quantum mechanics (Cret¸u 2020a, Roque´ 1997). Scientists,
in such cases, successfully navigated not only shifts in broad perspectives but also later
shifts in objectivity standards (Galison 1997). What the history of objectivity demon-
strates is that conceptual relativism can be avoided as long as shifts in objectivity (a). are
not abrupt and discontinuous and (b). do not correspond to shifts in broad perspectives.
Thus, knowledge derived from scientific instruments can be objective despite changes in
broad perspectives.
What if broad perspectives are broader?15 That is, what if the objectivity standards
themselves define the perspectives, and when they shift, the instruments and their deliver-
ances also shift? To be clear, the critic may insist that the objectivity led response leaves
open the possibility that instrumental incommensurability occurs when objectivity stan-
dards shift. Drawing on Galison (1997) and Hacking (1983), who have presented detailed
case studies involving instrument led continuity despite changes in theory, a novel answer
that demonstrates instrument led continuity despite changes in objectivity standards is
offered in the next section.
15Thanks to Nicos Stylianou for very useful discussions on this issues and for pushing me to clarify this
point.
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3.3 Instrument Led Response
The second response to instrumental incommensurability resides in the fact that instru-
ments and their outputs typically do not change when objectivity standards change. To be
clear, the claim is that when objectivity standards shift, scientists who adhere to the new
predominant standard can nevertheless use instruments designed according to previous
objectivity standards. Importantly, the outcomes of such instruments are not typically
contested either. This is not to say that in some cases instruments and their datum may
not lose their original significance or the datum may not be interpreted differently. This
can of course occur, but typically, the datum stays the same.16 To illustrate this claim,
let us consider two brief examples.
The first example, drawn from physics, is primed to illustrate the fact that instru-
ments and their deliverances can be markedly cross-perspectival, even when perspectives
are defined by the objectivity norms themselves. That is, despite being built or used to
deliver data under the auspices of one standard of objectivity, the instrument and the data
produced, often successfully survive shifts in objectivity standards. The cloud chamber,
constitutes one example of an instrument spanning a lengthy and versatile career through
shifting objectivity standards. The cloud chamber is undoubtedly one of the most impor-
tant instruments of the 20th century.17 It played an important role in many Nobel Prizes
in Physics and it gave rise to the tradition of ‘golden events’ – that is, the tradition of
making visible and capturing on film the interactions of sub-atomic phenomena.18
The cloud chamber was invented by C.T.R. Wilson in 1911 under the patronage
of mechanical objectivity. Whilst pursuing research in atmospheric phenomena, Wilson
recorded the first golden event, of an alpha ray, in 1911. The cloud chamber, though de-
veloped by Wilson for the study of atmospheric phenomena, was soon appropriated by
the Cavendish physicists to study sub-atomic phenomena. After a series of tweaks and
16Ackerman (1985), for example, notes that “[w]hen our theories change, we may conceive of the
significance of the instrument and the world with which it is interacting differently, and the datum of an
instrument reading may change in significance, but the datum can nonetheless stay the same, and will
typically be expected to do so.” (p. 33).
17The historical details regarding the cloud chamber are primarily drawn from Galison (1997),
Das Gupta and Ghosh (1946), and Blackett (1960).
18See Staley (1999) on golden events and a criticism of Galison (1997).
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improvements, the cloud chamber gave rise to further golden events, such as the photo-
graph of the positron published by Carl D. Anderson in 1932 and the joint discovery of
the muon by Anderson and Seth H. Neddermeyer in 1936. The tradition of golden events,
inaugurated by C.T.R. Wilson under the auspices of mechanical objectivity, gathered
momentum under the patronage of trained judgment with Anderson’s discovery of the
positron, and it is still very much alive almost a century later, and in spite of various
changes in standards of objectivity. Importantly, neither C. T. R. Wilson’s photograph of
alpha rays, nor Carl Anderson’s photograph of the positron have lost their significance,
nor have Wilson’s cloud chamber or Anderson’s cognate apparatus been called into ques-
tion. These photographs were produced from the vantage point of perspectives governed
by standards of objectivity different from the standards which originally governed the
invention of the cloud chamber and were embedded within successive broad perspectives
governed by yet different norms of objectivity. Thus, what we can learn from the history
of the cloud chamber is that changes in objectivity have not transformed or denied the
significance of either the cloud chamber itself or of its capacity to produce golden events.
To put it differently, its ladeness to different norms of objectivity did not bring about
conceptual relativism via instrumental incommensurability. On the contrary, it is clear
that the use and importance of the cloud chamber cuts across both broad perspectives
and changing objectivity standards, and it is thus markedly cross-perspectival.
The second example, drawn from astrophysics, focusses on the data, rather than
the instruments per se. It purports to show that even when certain instruments become
obsolete, their deliverances retain their original authority despite shifts in objectivity stan-
dards. The example concerns the photographic plates of the spectra of stars that became
available towards the end of the 19th century with the invention of the spectroscope.19
By attaching a prism or a slit to a telescope to separate the rays of starlight by their
wavelength, their unique spectra or absorption lines can be recorded and their brightness
can thus be measured. The first successful attempt to photograph the spectra of stars
belongs to Henry Draper, who photographed the spectrum of Vega in 1872, with similar
19Unless otherwise indicated, the historical details pertaining to this example are drawn from Hoffleit
(1991).
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research also being conducted by William and Margaret Huggins.
Henry Draper’s photographic plates were analysed and measured by Edward C.
Pickering at the Harvard Observatory and constituted the catalyst for the creation of the
Henry Draper Memorial which gave rise to the Draper Catalogue of Stellar Spectra, first
published in 1890 by Pickering and Williamina Fleming, with subsequent instalments in
1897 from Antonia Maury, and in 1901 from Annie Jump Cannon. The Draper Catalogue
of Stellar Spectra constitutes the first modern classification of stars and is the forerunner
of both The Henry Draper Catalogue (published between 1918 and 1924 by Annie Jump
Cannon) 20 and of Morgan, Keenan, and Kellman’s 1943 Atlas of Stellar Spectra.
Importantly, for our purposes, the Henry Draper Catalogue was designed according
to the canons of mechanical objectivity, whereas the Morgan, Keenan, and Kellman’s
Atlas of Stellar Spectra relied on trained judgement. Yet despite the use of mechanical
objectivity, the results of the Henry Draper Catalogue were not only fully understood
and recognised by their successor, but the spectrographic photographs on which it was
based preserved, in bulk, their significance. Although Morgan, Keenan, and Kellman used
different instruments, published new photographs, and operated with a distinct norm of
objectivity, i.e., trained judgment, they cite the Draper Catalogue as the direct forerunner
of their own classification (see Morgan et al. 1943 and Daston and Galison 2007 for details).
The spectrographic photographs which constitute the basis of the Henry Draper Catalogue
of Stellar Spectra can thus be said to cut across shifting objectivity standards. What this
example suggests then is that changes in objectivity standards did not lead to conceptual
relativism brought about by instrumental incommensurability.
Two examples cannot conclusively show that instrumental incommensurability can-
not occur or that it does not lead to conceptual relativism when objectivity standards
shift. Reflecting on these examples suggests nevertheless that conceptual relativism can be
avoided when instruments and their deliverances survive shifts in objectivity standards.
Moreover, conceptual relativism via instrumental incommensurability can also be avoided
20Two separate extensions have been published as well, the Henry Draper Extension, published between
1925 and 1936, and the Henry Draper Extension Charts, first published in 1937, work on both being
undertaken by Annie Jump Cannon and her assistant, Margaret Mayall.
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when shifts in broad perspectives do not correspond to objectivity standards shifts. Thus,
instead of constituting a novel epistemic challenge, the dependence of instruments on
broad perspectives, when closely analysed, provides instead the means to mount a novel
response to the old epistemic challenge of conceptual relativism.
To sum up, it was shown that not only are objectivity standards and broad perspec-
tives not concomitantly shifting, but instruments and their deliverances can cut across
both broad perspectives and objectivity standards. So whilst objectivity standards and
instruments are in some respects perspectival, by being historically and intellectually
situated both within and outside broad perspectives, they are equally cross-perspectival.
Thus, the scientific instruments themselves, and the objectivity standards governing them,
equally constitute tools to block conceptual relativism brought about by instrumental in-
commensurability.
4 Narrow Perspectives
This section examines the nature of the dependence of instruments on ‘narrow perspec-
tives’, the resulting problem(s), and a potential solution. Narrow perspectives, unlike
broad perspectives, have a significantly restricted scope, yet they are not restricted to
a single theory or model. Narrow perspectives are distinctively perspectives or points of
view, unrestricted to any particular theory (Cret¸u 2020a) or just to theory (Massimi
2012). Narrow perspectives can be understood as “sophisticated theoretical framework[s]
that encompasses the set of theoretical interests and background theoretical knowledge
(principles and assumptions equally) that a researcher or group of researchers can be
said to hold at any given time” (Cret¸u 2020a, p. 29). Or a narrow perspective can be
constituted by as a scientist’s epistemic perspective which includes beliefs about the phe-
nomena under investigation, the correct functioning of instruments and the validation
of their outputs, but also more general beliefs about their “perceptual system, cognitive
faculties, measurement devices, and their reliability as sources of belief” (Massimi 2012,
p. 41). Either notion of perspective characterises the working stance of a scientist, who,
in one capacity or another, comes to have a bearing on scientific instruments, directly by
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using them, or indirectly by affecting the data. Since scientific instruments can become
thus laden to a scientist’s (narrow) perspective, elucidating the nature of the ensuing
ladeness will prove highly instructive.
4.1 Instrumental Theory-Ladeness
Scientific instruments may become laden to a scientists’s viewpoint in a variety of ways.
In the first instance, theory ladeness can occur in cases where the theory governing the in-
strument and the theory of the phenomena are one and the same. Second, theory-ladeness
and practical problems therewith can survene either as a result of an over-attachment to
the theory that clashes with the discordant data, or can be due to practical problems of
theory ladeness such as “experimental design, failure to interpret observations correctly,
possible experimenter bias, and difficulties in data acquisition” (Franklin 2015, p. 155).
In the first instance, theory ladeness is avoided by making sure that the theory gov-
erning the instrument and the theory of the phenomena are different. As Franklin argues,
“no obvious problems arise for the testing of the theory of the phenomena” in such cases
(Franklin 2015, fn. 8, p. 439). And, even in cases in which the theory governing the in-
strument and the theory of the phenomena partially overlap or overlap to a large extent,
successful strategies for overcoming vicious circularity have already been suggested by the
New Experimentalists. For example, as early as three decades ago, Franklin et al. (1989)
discussed the possibility of using an instrument whose operation depends on the same
hypothesis as that of the phenomena under test and suggested that in such cases the
calibration of the instrument should suffice to mitigate the threat of vicious theory lade-
ness. The instrument under test would be independently calibrated against an already
validated instrument, by measuring a different phenomena whose theory overlaps with
neither instrument. Later, Chalmers (2003) offered a detailed case study of the electron
microscope, showing that in spite of a deep theory-ladeness, instruments could neverthe-
less be used to collect data about a phenomena, even in cases where the theory of the
phenomena was involved in the use of the instrument. As Chalmers notes, ”[t]he inter-
dependence of theory and data [...] can, in appropriate circumstances, be exploited in a
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way that confounds rather than aids the sceptic” (p. 494). Recently, Beauchemin (2017)
showed that in the cases of conglomerate instruments such as the ATLAS detector at the
LHC, theory input may be essential to confer epistemic value to certain measurements.21
In fact, “theory-ladeness of measurement is necessary for [measurements] to constitute
observations” (p. 309), and often, progress in high energy physics can only be made by
mutually adjusting theory and experiment. What these authors show at length is that
regardless of how multiply perspectival the process of using instruments can become –
from using a thermometer, to using an electron microscope, to conglomerate instruments
such as the ATLAS detector at the LHC – there are epistemic strategies for avoiding
vicious theory ladeness. Insofar as such epistemic strategies can be deployed, instruments
remain an objective source of knowledge about the world.
In the second instance, at least one of the reasons which leads to theory-ladeness,
the over-attachment to the theory that clashes with the discordant data, can be better ex-
plained in terms of scientists’ (narrow) perspectives. Scientists’ (narrow) perspectives will
typically play an important role in accepting new data or in discarding it. For example, if
the data is unexpected, “scientists with different perspectives may respond differentially
to the same empirical knowledge,[...] impeding [the] authentication” of some hitherto
unknown phenomena (Cret¸u 2020a, p. 2) and leading to disagreement. In such cases, re-
gardless of the route taken to resolve the disagreement, scientists’ (narrow) perspectives
inadvertently affect the instruments and their outputs. Moreover, since narrow perspec-
tives can encompass elements of different theories the resulting ladeness may manifest in
more intricate ways. After all, instruments are not only dependent on a theory, but they
are also embedded within experiments, and experiments themselves can be theory-laden
in a variety of ways, as was recently argued, in different ways, by Karaca (2013) and
Schindler (2013); see also Franklin and Perovic 2019 for a recent overview of these issues.
An additional reason to think that an instrument’s dependence on a narrow perspec-
tive is distinct and possibly more complex than theory-ladeness consists in the potential
of an instrument to produce data which can overthrow a particular theory (see Franklin
21Thanks Antonis Antoniou for suggesting pointing me to Beauchemin’s work.
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and Perovic 2019 for more details).22 Since the instruments themselves may be recast
in a different light depending on how the data is received, let us call this instrumental
theory-ladeness. In the next and final section, a solution to instrumental theory-ladeness
is proposed.
4.2 Perspectivity Led Response
It was suggested that narrow perspectives contain within them elements that may engen-
der instrumental theory-ladeness. But, since narrow perspectives are restricted neither to
one theory not just to theory, they also contain justificatory tools to render instruments
and their data valid and objective. It is thus clear, that narrow perspectives have a two-
edged blade. Whilst their potential for engendering instrumental theory ladeness has been
made clear in the previous section, let us also expose their positive features.
Narrow perspectives can encompass both entrenched background assumptions, as
well as less entrenched ones pertaining to particular problems salient to working scientists
(Cret¸u 2020a, p. 32). Furthermore, narrow perspectives enable scientists to “self-reflect
on [their] beliefs, on the sources of [their] beliefs, the way beliefs cohere with one another,
no less than the way in which they, individually and jointly, are anchored to the empirical
ground via reliable methods” (Massimi 2012, p. 49). Thus, narrow perspectives, unlike
broad perspectives, embed richer, more specific resources for justifying why we have good
reasons to use a particular instrument, why the instrument is working properly, and
why the data it delivers is reliable. And, they can embed distinctively non-perspectival
epistemic strategies to overcome instrumental theory-ladeness that are neither specific to
a broad perspective, nor governed by specific objectivity standards, but which instead are
more broadly embedded within the epistemology of science.
Riches of such epistemic strategies, some directly pertaining to instruments, some
pertaining more generally to experiment (and only indirectly pertaining to instruments,
have been identified and discussed by the New Experimentalists Hacking (1983), Franklin
(1990; 1986), Mayo (1996), Chalmers (2003), Karaca (2013). A list of such strategies
22It is doubtful that an instrument or its data also have the potential to overthrow a broad perspective
or an objectivity standard, or even a narrow perspective in fact.
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provided by Franklin (1989) contains: i) experimental checks and calibration in which
the apparatus reproduces known phenomena to reproducing artifacts that are known
in advance to be present; ii) intervention, in which the experimenter manipulates the
object under observation; iii) independent confirmation using different experiments; iv)
elimination of plausible sources of errors and alternative explanations of the result; v)
using the results themselves to argue for their validity; vi) using an independently well-
corroborated theory of the phenomena to explain the results; vii) using an apparatus based
on a well-corroborated theory; viii) using statistical arguments. Whilst such strategies do
no entirely eliminate the threat of instrumental theory-ladeness, they go a long way in
safeguarding instruments and their deliverances against this threat. And importantly, such
strategies ensure that instruments can deliver apersepctival knowledge about the world.
To sum up, in this section it has been shown that narrow perspectives have a dual
nature in that they can both undermine and vindicate instruments and their deliverances,
and the knowledge engendered within them.
5 Conclusion and Prospectus
It is not uncommon for philosophical views to overreach. For better or worse, that is
also the predicament of perspectivism, whose intuitive appeal has gained the view as
many supporters as detractors. Beyond the intuitive appeal of perspectivism, questions
of epistemic novelty and fruitfulness must take precedence. Yet the novelty of a claim, or
lack thereof, can only be established through careful analysis, which, more often than not,
may lead to surprising consequences. For example, the present analysis proceeded from a
diagnosis of the epistemic unfruitfulness of the claim that ‘instruments are perspectival’ to
an epistemically fruitful investigation with instruments at the fore. The instruments first
approach, moved from a predictable diagnosis to extending the reach of perspectivism in
surprising ways which honour the spirit, if not the letter of this increasingly popular view.
In keeping with one of the core tenets of perspectivism, forays into the history of
science – through the scholarship on objectivity and the history of canonical instruments
(i.e., the cloud chamber) – disclosed previously untapped resources for resolving well
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known problems. And, in line with the second tenet of perspectivism, instruments have
been restored to their function of giving us knowledge about the world. Yet as scientific
practice becomes increasingly dominated by one instrument – the digital computer – new
questions lay ahead.
A compelling avenue for future research is to investigate the degree to which the
described solutions bear out in realms of science increasingly dominated by the digital
computer. Such a task would require, amongst other things, an extension of the scholarship
on objectivity, the identification of clear cut cases where the digital computer acts as an
instrument, as well as a better understanding of the relationship between digital computers
and broad and narrow perspectives. Further, it would be important to determine whether
the digital computer is a natural extension of traditional instruments, leading to the same
problems, to which the same solutions apply. Or, whether new problems and solutions
might require an even finer grain of perspectivism.23
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